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NOTES
ASSESSING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
CAPITAL CHILD RAPE STATUTES
Death is factually different. Death is final. Death is
irremediable. Death is unknowable; it goes beyond this
world .... Death is different .... '
These words resound throughout capital punishment
jurisprudence, 2 and refer to the punishment of death and its
finality. But what of the crimes that death is imposed for-must
they too be of a different kind? Must the punishment of death
follow the lex talionisphilosophy of an "eye.for an eye"3 and take
one life only where another life has been taken? The Supreme
Court has held that the death penalty itself is not per se

1 See RANDALL COYNE & LYN ENTZEROTH, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 104 (1994) (quoting Professor Amsterdam in his oral argument
in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976)).
2 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring)
("The penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in
degree but in kind."). As of April 1, 1999, over 3,500 men and women across the
United States sit on death row awaiting execution-each one for the crime of
murder. See NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC., DEATH ROW
U.SA. (1999).
3 See RAYMOND PATERNOSTER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 252 (1991).
Lex talionis is the retributive principle that the punishment must fit the crime. See
id.; JAMES J. MEGIVERN, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN HISTORICAL AND THEOLOGICAL
SURVEY 44, 224, 465 (1997). Lex talionis is "an eye for an eye, a finger for a finger,
then a life for a life." Id. at 44 (applying the requisite proportional punishment to
the injuries inflicted against another). "'[It is] simple straightforward revenge.' "Id.
at 465 (quoting JEAN-MARE AUBERT, CHRETIENS ET PEINE DE MORT [CHRISTIANS
AND THE DEATH PENALTY] 67 (Paris: Relais Desclee, 1978)); see also Exodus 21:2325 ("MYlou shall give life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for
foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, stripe for stripe."); Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted." The OriginalMeaning, 57 CAL. L. REV.
839, 844 (1969) (explaining that "[lex talionis] is generally considered a law of
retribution-the product of a vengeful deity").
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unconstitutional, 4 but the Court has never concretely answered
the question posed above. The Court has never specifically held
that only the taking of another human life may lead to the
punishment of death.
Many states and the federal government have statutes on
their books allowing capital punishment for non-homicidal
crimes. 5 Capital child rape statutes, which call for the death
penalty when a person is convicted of raping a child under a
specified age, have been added to this list of non-homicidal death
penalty statutes. 6 These capital child rape statutes are intended
to protect our children from offenders.7 Although children need
4 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 177-78 (1976) ("For nearly two centuries,
this Court, repeatedly and often expressly, has recognized that capital punishment
is not invalid per se."); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890) (stating that "the
punishment of death is not cruel within the meaning of... the Constitution").
5 These "non-homicidal" crimes include treason, kidnapping, drug trafficking
and aircraft hijacking. See 18 U.S.C. § 3591 (1994) (treason); 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)
(1994) (continuing criminal enterprise); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-51-201 (Michie 1997)
(treason); CAL. PENAL CODE § 37 (Deering Supp. 1999) (treason); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 18-3-301 (1999) (kidnapping); FLA. STAT. chs. 893.135, 921.142 (1999) (drug
trafficking); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-44 (1996) (aircraft hijacking); GA. CODE ANN. §
16-11-1 (1996) (treason).
6 The sexual abuse of children has come to the forefront of this country's
attention. Legislatures have passed numerous laws aimed at child molesters. See,
e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42(A)(4), (D)(2) (West Supp. 1999). The statute states
that:
Aggravated rape is a rape committed upon a person ... where the ...
sexual intercourse is deemed to be without lawful consent of the victim
because it is committed under any one or more of the following
circumstances: ... [wihen the victim is under the age of twelve years. Lack
of knowledge of the victim's age shall not be a defense.... Whoever
commits the crime of aggravated rape shall be punished by life
imprisonment .... However, if the victim was under the age of twelve
years ... the offender shall be punished by death or life imprisonment ....
Id.; see also H.B. 801, 144th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Ga. 1997) (proposing to
amend the current rape statute to state "a person convicted of the offense of rape of
a person who is less than 12 years of age on the date of the offense shall be punished
by death, by imprisonment for life without parole, or by imprisonment for not less
than ten nor more than 20 years"). Georgia's House carried the vote over to the 1998
session, where it was passed and adopted on February 18, 1998. See id. This bill has
been reintroduced in the 1999 Regular Session of the Georgia House of
Representatives. See H.B. 116, 145th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Ga. 1999); see also
Megan O'Matz, Pa. House GOP Chiefs Eye Death Penalty for Sex Crimes But Legal
Experts Say the State Would Be on Shaky Ground to Do So, ALLENTOWN MORNING
CALL, Jan. 28, 1997, at Al (discussing how Pennsylvania's House Republican
leaders intend to work to pass legislation calling for the death penalty for habitual
sex offenders).
7 See H.R. 116, 145th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Ga. 1999) (stating that the
purpose of the Act is to "protect children from the heinous crime of rape and
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protection, this Note argues that the imposition of the death
penalty under these statutes violates the United States
Constitution's Eighth Amendment prohibition against "cruel and
unusual punishment."8
This Note will explore those theories which must be
considered to determine the constitutionality of a capital child
rape statute. 9 Part I reviews the history of the Supreme Court's
creation of a "proportionality test" in applying the Eighth
Amendment to the punishment of death. Part II discusses the
application of the proportionality test to capital child rape
statutes and illustrates that, as a prerequisite to imposing the
death penalty, the Court requires that the victim is murdered.
Part III presents the requirement of mental culpability for the
victim's death, which is found in decisions imposing capital
punishment for "non-triggerman" felony-murderers. This part
also discusses the fact that even where death has occurred,
aggravating circumstances must exist for capital punishment to
be constitutionally imposed. It posits that these requirements in
homicide cases further illustrate that the death of the victim is a
prerequisite to imposing capital punishment. Part IV discusses
what the Court must consider when it determines the value of

aggravated sodomy"); see also O'Matz, supra note 6 (indicating that lawmakers were
proposing a capital child rape statute to stop the molestation of children by chronic
abusers).
8 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." Id.
9 The Supreme Court was petitioned to review a Louisiana decision finding a
capital child rape statute constitutional, but the Court declined to hear the case. See
Bethley v. Louisiana, 520 U.S. 1259 (1997). Three Justices, however, attached a
statement to the memorandum indicating that they could hear such a case if one of
the men petitioning was actually sentenced. See id. Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and
Breyer noted that the Supreme Court only has jurisdiction over state-court
decisions when the highest court of the state has issued a final judgment. See id.
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (1994)). The petitioner in Bethley, however, had not been
sentenced, or even convicted, therefore there was no controversy subject to the
Court's review. See id; see also Flynt v. Ohio, 451 U.S. 619, 620 (1981) (noting that a
criminal prosecution is not final until the defendant has been sentenced); WALTER
F. MURPHY ET AL., AhMlECAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 80 (2d ed. 1995)
(explaining that the Supreme Court only has jurisdiction over a " 'case or
controversy' [under Article III, section 2, clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution], that is, a
real dispute between genuinely adverse parties involving injury, or immediate
threat of injury, to a legally protected right"). See Bethley, 520 U.S. 1259 (noting
that the denial of certiorari was not a reflection on the merits of the case). Many
people have concluded that this means that once someone is convicted under this
statute the Court will grant a writ of certiorari.
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such a statute in protecting our children. This Note submits
that the punishment of death for the rape of a child is a violation
of the Eighth Amendment because capital child rape statutes
would not pass the Supreme Court's proportionality test under
the Eighth Amendment. Furthermore, the crime lacks the
bright-line prerequisite death of the victim. Indeed, the threat of
death for a child rapist is more of a danger to the child victims
than it is a safeguard from these predators. Thus, arguably, any
state with such a statute breaches its duty to protect children.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE DEATH PENALTY AND THE EIGHTH
AMENDMENT: A REQUIREMENT OF PROPORTIONALITY

A. The EighthAmendment
The Eighth Amendment states that, "[e]xcessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted."10 The "cruel and unusual
punishment" clause was adopted from the English Bill of Rights
of 1689,11 where it was not only a prohibition against certain
forms of punishment, but "a reiteration of the English policy
against disproportionate penalties." 12 Nevertheless, after the
adoption of the American Bill of Rights, "state and federal jurists
accepted the view that the clause [only] prohibited certain
methods of punishment]." 13
10 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
11 See

Granucci, supra note 3, at 840.
Id. at 860.
13 Id. at 842. As early as the 1870s the Supreme Court, in reviewing capital
cases, focused on the constitutionality of the particular method of execution rather
than capital punishment in and of itself. See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
In Wilkerson, the defendant challenged his sentence of execution by firing squad.
See id. at 131. In upholding the constitutionality of this mode of execution, the
Court stated that it is difficult to define exactly the meaning of the cruel and
unusual punishment clause. See id. at 135-36. The Court held, however, that "it is
safe to affirm that punishments of torture... and all others in the same line of
unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by that amendment to the Constitution." Id. at
136. The Court reiterated this view in In re Kemmler, where it held that death by
electrocution was not a cruel and unusual form of punishment, because it resulted
in an instantaneous and painless death. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 443
(1890) (citing People v. Durston, 7 N.Y.S. 813 (1889)). The Court stated,
"[plunishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the
punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the
Constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more
than the mere extinguishment of life." Id. at 447.
12
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The Supreme Court's review of the "cruel and unusual
punishment" clause did not include a consideration of the
proportionality of a punishment to the crime until Weems v.
United States.14 There, the Court stated that "it is a precept of
justice that punishment for [a] crime should be graduated and
proportioned to [the] offense." 15 The Court then applied this
precept to the Eighth Amendment. In Weems, the Supreme
Court brought a new meaning to the words "cruel and unusual
punishment" in the Eighth Amendment-the Court required
proportionality of the punishment to the crime-and new
challenges to the punishment of death. 16 Even so, it took the
Court many years to set forth the requirements of the
proportionality test brought forth in Weems.
B. Modern Death Penalty Jurisprudence:The Proportionality
Test
Almost fifty years after Weems, the Court stated that the
Eighth Amendment "must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
The proportionality factor was not reintroduced into death penalty
jurisprudence until 1892. See O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892). The Court
was asked to review a punishment of a fine of $6,638.72, or if the defendant
defaulted, imprisonment at hard labor for 19,914 days, imposed by the state of
Vermont for a violation of state liquor laws. See id. at 330. In ruling that the Eighth
Amendment did not apply to the states, the Court did not reach the question of the
excessiveness of the punishment. See id. at 331-32. Three dissenting judges,
however, indicated that, given the offense charged, an otherwise acceptable form of
punishment could be cruel because it was excessive in length or severity and,
therefore, greatly disproportionate to the crime. See id. at 339-40 (Field, J.,
dissenting); id. at 370-71 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
14 217 U.S. 349 (1910). In Weerns, the Court found that a sentence of
imprisonment for fifteen years for falsifying public and official documents was a
cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See id. at
380-81. In its analysis, the Court pointed out that the meaning of "cruel and
unusual punishment" was never exactly decided-the Framers themselves felt the
meaning of the clause was too indefinite to include, but it was agreed to by a
majority and adopted anyway. See id. at 369. The Court found that, although it had
previously held that the ban on "cruel and unusual punishment" referred only to
torture or some other such barbarous method of punishment, "[i]n the application of
a constitution... [the Court's] contemplation cannot be only of what has been but of
what may be." Id. at 373.
)z Id. at 367.

16 See id. at 349. Weems actually brought forth three pivotal pronouncements:
(1) that the meaning of the Eighth Amendment is not limited to the Framers' intent;
(2) that the Eighth Amendment bars excessive punishments; and (3) that what is
considered excessive changes with time. See PATERNOSTER supra note 3, at 52.
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society." 17 This sentiment has echoed throughout modern death
penalty jurisprudence.' 8
By the early 1970s, the evolving
standards of decency changed the course of what the prohibition
against "cruel and unusual punishment" and the requirement of
proportionality meant with respect to capital punishment. In
Furman v. Georgia,19 the Supreme Court paved a new road for
those seeking to challenge the death penalty by requiring that
capital sentences be dealt out in a non-arbitrary and noncapricious manner. 20 The statutes in Furman were typical of
17 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). In Trop, the Court reviewed the
constitutionality of the punishment of denationalization imposed on an Army
deserter. The case was not decided on the concept of proportionality. Rather, the
Court found that it was unconstitutional to strip a man of his most fundamental
right-to have rights. See id. at 101-02. The plurality, however, in dicta, stated that
certain punishments may be imposed "depending upon the enormity of the crime."
Id. at 100.
18 "Perhaps the most important principle in analyzing 'cruel and unusual'
punishment questions is one that is reiterated again and again... [the] language
'must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.' " Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 329 (1972)
(Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)); see also
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 156 (1987) ("Deeply ingrained in our legal tradition
is the idea that the more purposeful is the criminal conduct, the more serious is the
offense, and, therefore, the more severely it ought to be punished."); Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797-99 (1982) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184
(1976)) (holding that the death penalty is appropriate only when the crime is a
"grievous... affront to humanity" and discussing the relevance of intent in all
decisions to impose the death penalty); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)
(holding that, in determining whether a punishment comports with the Eighth
Amendment, the Court must consider "the public attitudes concerning a particular
sentence"); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 ("[A]n assessment of contemporary values
concerning the infliction of a challenged sanction is relevant to the application of the
Eighth Amendment.").
19 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
20 Furman was a decision unique in length and kind. It was "the longest
decision ever to appear in the U.S. Reports." Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker,
Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of ConstitutionalRegulation of
CapitalPunishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 362 (1995). The Court issued a brief
plurality opinion. Each Justice, both in the majority and dissent, wrote his own
opinion. No one opinion clearly indicated which arguments would prevail in future
death penalty decisions. See id. at 362-63. It was also the first time the Court
seriously questioned the constitutionality of the death penalty itself. See Gregg, 428
U.S. at 168-69. The Furman Court, in its five to four decision, determined that the
imposition of capital punishment, in a murder case and two rape cases, was a
violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40. Ultimately
invalidating the death penalty statutes of Georgia and Texas, the Furman Court
found that death was being imposed in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Due to
the lack of standard guidelines, the determination of whether a defendant should
live or die was left to the uncontrolled discretion of judges or juries, allowing
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almost every other state's death penalty statutes. Thus, Furman
effectively invalidated almost every existing death penalty
statute. In response, legislatures throughout the country quickly
modified their statutes to retain the death penalty as a form of
21
punishment.
The Supreme Court was called upon to review these revised
statutes in Gregg v. Georgia2 2 and four accompanying decisions. 23
discrimination to permeate the decision-making process. See id. at 253. (Douglas, J.,
concurring). Justice Stewart further stated that "[t]hese death sentences are cruel
and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual."
Id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring). He further opined that it is unconstitutional to
inflict the "sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to
be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed." Id. at 310. Although two Justices argued
that the death penalty was cruel and unusual in all cases, see id. at 257 (Brennan,
J., concurring) and id. at 314 (White, J., concurring), the decision was limited to the
holding that it is cruel and unusual punishment when the sentencing authority has
total discretion to impose the death penalty in capital cases. See id. at 240.
The high service rendered by the 'cruel and unusual' punishment clause of
the Eighth Amendment is to require legislatures to write penal laws that
are evenhanded, nonselective, and nonarbitrary, and to require judges to
see to it that general laws are not applied sparsely, selectively, and spottily
to unpopular groups....
[These discretionary statutes are unconstitutional in their operation. They
are pregnant with discrimination and discrimination is an ingredient not
compatible with the idea of equal protection of the laws that is implicit in
the ban on 'cruel and unusual' punishments.
Id. at 256-57 (Douglas, J. concurring):
[Plast and present legislative judgment with respect to the death penalty
loses much of its force when viewed in light of the recurring practice of
delegating sentencing authority to the jury and the fact that a jury, in its
own discretion and without violating its trust or any statutory policy, may
refuse to impose the death penalty no matter what the circumstances of
the crime.
Id. at 314 (White, J., concurring).
21 See PATERNOSTER, supra note 3, at 58. In order to eliminate the problems
associated with jury discretion, state legislatures passed statutes calling for
mandatory death penalty sentences or created guided discretion statutes. See id.
The mandatory death penalty statutes removed all sentencing discretion from the
jury. Once a defendant was convicted of a narrowly classified murder, the death
sentence was automatically imposed. Guided discretion statutes left some
sentencing discretion with the juries. See id. at 59-60. These guided discretion
statutes called for bifurcated capital trials where the defendant's guilt was
determined at a "guilt phase," followed by a "penalty phase" where the jury
determined what penalty to impose. Id. at 60. These discretionary statutes
"restrict[ed the jury's] exercise [of discretion] by providing a list of relevant factors"
which were aggravating and mitigating circumstances that the jury was required to
consider during the penalty phase of the trial. Id.
22 428 U.S. 153.
23 See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (reviewing Louisiana's murder
statute, which mandated the death penalty whenever the jury found a specific
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This time, the Supreme Court upheld the discretionary statutes
because they ensured that the death penalty would not be
imposed in an arbitrary and capricious manner by requiring
individualized consideration of each particular defendant. 24 The
Court also enumerated the requirements of the proportionality
test in reviewing capital statutes. The proportionality test
required them to "look to objective indicia that reflect the public
attitude toward a given sanction."25 In determining whether
these contemporary standards were met, the Court looked to
many things including: 1) history and precedent;26 2) legislative
intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm and that the defendant was engaged in an
armed robbery); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (considering North
Carolina's mandatory death penalty for first degree murder); Jurek v. Texas, 428
U.S. 262 (1976) (reviewing Texas's guided discretion statute, which required that a
separate sentencing proceeding be conducted before the jury that issued the
conviction, that all relevant evidence be admitted, and that both the prosecution
and the defense be permitted to argue for and against the death penalty); Proffitt v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (reviewing a similar Florida statute that also required
the parties to produce evidence relating to aggravating and mitigating factors

specified by law).
24 The statutes in these states called for bifurcated capital trials, a
consideration during the penalty phase of both aggravating and mitigating factors,
and an independent review of the appropriateness of the capital punishment in each
case. See generally Jurek, 428 U.S. at 267; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 248; Gregg, 428 U.S.
at 163-64. The mandatory statutes were struck down because they did not allow for
individualized consideration. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (citing Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)).
While the prevailing practice of individualizing sentencing determinations
generally reflects simply enlightened policy rather than a constitutional
imperative, we believe that in capital cases the fundamental respect for
humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment requires consideration of the
character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of
the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the
process of inflicting the penalty of death.
Id. (citation omitted); Roberts, 428 U.S. at 333 ("The constitutional vice of
mandatory death sentence statutes-lack of focus on the circumstances of the
particular offense and the character and propensities of the offender-is not
resolved by Louisiana's limitation of first-degree murder to various categories of
killings."); see also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978).
Given that the imposition of death by public authority is so profoundly
different from all other penalties, we cannot avoid the conclusion that an
individualized decision is essential in capital cases.... The nonavailability
of corrective or modifying mechanisms with respect to an executed capital
sentence underscores the need for individualized consideration as a
constitutional requirement in imposing the death sentence.
Id.
2
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.
26 See id. at 176-77 (discussing the historical acceptance of capital punishment
for murder).
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judgments;27 3) jury decisions; 28 4) the retributive and deterrent
effects of the punishment;29 and 5) "whether [the punishment]
comports with the basic concept of human dignity."30 Although
the Court emphasized the importance of society's standards, it
reserved its right to review the excessiveness of the
punishment.31 Gregg, and its accompanying cases, provided
constitutional sanction to capital punishment for murder. The
Court applied the proportionality test to the "cruel and unusual
punishment" clause because man's evolving standards of decency
called for it.

32

II. APPLYING THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT TO THE DEATH PENALTY
FOR RAPE

The Supreme Court, in Gregg, upheld the death penalty as a
constitutionally permissible punishment for murder.3 3 But,
under what other circumstances could the death penalty be
justified?
As early as the 1600s, "idolatry, witchcraft,
27 See id at 175-80 (noting that "legislative judgment weighs heavily in
ascertaining [contemporary] standards [of decency]" and that 35 states have enacted
new capital murder statutes).
28 See id. at 182 (stating that "the actions ofjuries in many states since Furman
are fully compatible with the legislative judgments.., as to the continued utility
and necessity of capital punishment in appropriate [murder] cases").
29 See id. at 184-86 (indicating that retributively capital punishment is "the
appropriate sanction in extreme cases" but that there is no concrete statistical
evidence indicating whether or not capital punishment has any deterrent effect).
30 Id. at 182, 183 (noting that an imposed sanction "cannot be so totally without
penological justification that it results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering").
31 See id. at 173-74 ("[O]ur cases also make clear that public perceptions of
standards of decency with respect to criminal sanctions are not conclusive. A
penalty also must accord with 'the dignity of man,' which is the 'basic concept
underlying the Eighth Amendment.' "). Using this proportionality test, the Gregg
Court ultimately proclaimed that "the punishment of death does not invariably
violate the Constitution." Id. at 169. Moreover, the Court held that capital
punishment for the crime of murder is not a disproportionate punishment and,
therefore, capital punishment for murder is constitutional. See id. at 187 ("[Wlhen a
life has been taken deliberately by the offender, we cannot say that the punishment
is invariably disproportionate to the crime. It is an extreme sanction, suitable to the
most extreme of crimes.").
32 The Supreme Court looked to the state legislatures' reactions to Furman as
objective indicia of society's view of the death penalty. The Court found that "at
least 35 [sltates ha[d] enacted new statutes that provide for the death penalty for at

least some crimes that result in the death of another person." Id. at 179-80
(footnote omitted). Reasoning that "legislative judgment weighs heavily in
ascertaining [society's] standards," the Court concluded that capital punishment
had not been rejected by the people. Id. at 175.
33 See id. at 187.
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blasphemy, murder, assault in sudden anger, sodomy, buggery,
adultery, statutory rape, rape, manstealing, perjury in a capital
trial, and rebellion" were all classified as capital offenses in
America.3 4 Whether the modem day test of proportionality and
the evolving standards of decency permit statutes, which impose
capital punishment for non-homicidal crimes, such as child rape,
to pass constitutional muster is, however, another question.
A. The ProportionalityRequirement as Applied to the Death
Penalty for Rape
Prior to Furman35 and Gregg,3 6 the Supreme Court refused
to review the constitutionality of imposing capital punishment
for the crime of rape. In 1953, in Rudolph v. Alabama,37 the
Supreme Court denied a writ of certiorari where a defendant
appealed a sentence of death for the rape of a young woman. 38
Three Justices dissented, however, maintaining that there was a
substantial question as to whether the Constitution permitted
"the imposition of the death penalty on a convicted rapist who
has neither taken life nor endangered human life."3 9 The dissent
noted the modem trend towards the abolishment of the death
penalty for rape. 40 The dissenters questioned whether a less
severe penalty for the crime of rape would more likely achieve
the goals of punishment. 41 Furthermore, they also questioned
whether the constitutional ban on disproportionate punishments
permitted "the taking of human life to protect a value other than
human life."

42

34 Furman,408 U.S. at 335 (Marshall, J., concurring).
35 See id.
36 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153.
37 Rudolph v. State, 152 So. 2d 662 (Ala. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 889
(1963).
38 See Rudolph, 375 U.S. 889, 889; Rudolph, 152 So. 2d at 663.
39 Rudolph, 375 U.S. at 889 (Goldberg, J.; Douglas, J.; Brennan, J., dissenting).
40 See id.
41 See id. at 891. Deterrence, isolation and rehabilitation have been found to be
permissible aims of punishment. See id. n.5. The Court noted that, in Canada, rape
ceased to be punishable by death in 1954. Thereafter, there was a steady decrease
in rape convictions (56 to 44) for the years 1957 to 1959 despite the population
increasing by 27 percent during the same period. See id. n.6. The Court, however,
pointed out that "[sluch statistics must of course be regarded with caution." Id.
42 Id.

1999]

CAPITAL CHILD RAPE STATUTES

1169

In 1970, the Fourth Circuit adopted the dissenters'
contentions in Ralph v. Warden.43 The court reiterated the
requirement of proportionality set forth in Weems." The court
reasoned that its review of the punishment of death for the crime
of rape "cannot rest on the subjective opinions of the judges who
imposed the sentence or of the judges who must review the
case."45 Finding that "the cruel and unusual punishment clause
is 'progressive' and 'is not fastened to the obsolete, but may
acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a
humane justice,'" 46 the court looked to "objective indication[s] of
society's 'evolving standards of decency'" to determine the
constitutionality of imposing the death penalty for rape. 47 The
court relied greatly on empirical data showing a trend toward
the statutory abolition of the death penalty for rape, 48 and the
infrequency with which the death penalty was imposed for
rape, 49 in ultimately holding that capital punishment is
disproportionate for the crime of rape when no life has been
taken or endangered. 50 Even so, the Fourth Circuit limited its
finding to the type of rape that had occurred in Ralph.51 It was
43 438 F.2d 786 (4th Cir. 1970). Ralph broke into the victim's home late at
night, where she and her son were asleep. He forcibly raped and sodomized the
young mother, threatening her and her son with death if she did not submit. See id.
at 788.
44 See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
45 Ralph, 438 F.2d at 789.
46 Id. at 790 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910)).
47 Id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).

See id. at 791-93. The Court noted:
[Tihe overwhelming majority of the nations of the world, legislatures of
more than two-thirds of the states of the union, and Congress, as evidenced
by its amendment of the District of Columbia Code [removing death as a
punishment for rape], now consider the death penalty to be an excessive
punishment for the crime of rape.
Id. at 792.
49 See id. (pointing out that in jurisdictions where the death penalty for rape is
permitted "the extreme infrequency of execution belies the argument" that "a
minority of jurisdictions [that do have capital rape statutes] accept the death
penalty for rape because it remains part of their criminal codes").
48

50 See id. at 793.

51 See id. The court noted that the legislative trend has shown that death is
considered an excessive punishment for rape in most jurisdictions. The court then
went on to state that "when a rapist does not take or endanger the life of his victim,
the selection of the death penalty from the range of punishment authorized by
statute is anomalous when compared to the large number of rapists who are
sentenced to prison." Id. The court "[did] not hold ... that death is an
unconstitutional punishment for all rapes." Id.

1170

ST. JOHN'S LAWREVIEW

[73:1159

not until Coker v. Georgia5 2 that the United States Supreme
Court addressed the question of whether it was constitutional to
impose the death penalty for the crime of rape.
The Court, in Coker, using the proportionality test, found
that the death penalty is a grossly disproportionate and
excessive punishment for the crime of rape of an adult woman
and, therefore, is forbidden by the Eighth Amendment as cruel
and unusual punishment. 53 To determine if the capital rape
statute met this test, the Court looked to objective factors based
on public sentiment. 54 These factors included: history and
precedent, legislative attitudes, and juries' responses as reflected
55
in their sentencing decisions.
Looking at history, the Court pointed out that "[a]t no time
in the last 50 years [had] the majority of States authorized death
as a punishment for rape."56 The Court did state, however, that
the death penalty was accepted by the states as an appropriate
form of punishment, as evidenced by the immediate reaction of
legislatures that, after Furman, "reinstituted the death penalty
for at least limited kinds of crimes."57 Even so, the Court found
that those actions were an indication of the acceptance of the
52 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion). Coker, although a review of a capital
rape statute where the victim was an adult, is still the leading case that the
Supreme Court should look to in assessing the constitutionality of capital child rape
statutes, for it involves markedly the most factually similar situation that exists in
modem death penalty jurisprudence.
Coker escaped from a Georgia prison where he was serving time for murder,
rape, kidnapping, and aggravated assault. In the course of committing an armed
robbery, amongst other offenses, he raped an adult woman in the presence of her
husband. See id. Although a violent felon, the Court limited its review of Coker's
case to the fact that death penalty for rape, regardless of the circumstances under
which it was committed, is a violation of the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 599.
5s See id. at 592. The Court reiterated the proportionality test set out in Gregg
by stating that "a punishment is 'excessive' and unconstitutional if it (1) makes no
measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing
more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is
grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime." Id. (emphasizing that the
"punishment might fail the [proportionality] test on either ground").

54

See id.

55 See id.
56 Id. at 593 (noting that "[in 1925, 18 states, the District of Columbia, and the
Federal Government authorized capital punishment for the rape of an adult female.
By 1971 just prior to the decision in Furman v. Georgia, that number had
declined... to 16 states plus the Federal Government") (footnote omitted).
57 Id. at 593-94 (observing that thirty-five states enacted death penalty
statutes based on the Furman decision); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
179-80 n.23 (listing the 35 state statutes).
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death penalty for murder and that when looking at the
legislative response to Furmanin regard to capital rape statutes
it told a different story. 58 Finding that Georgia was the only
state that currently authorized the death penalty for the rape of
an adult woman, the Court reasoned that "it obviously weighs
very heavily on the side of rejecting capital punishment as a
suitable penalty for raping an adult woman."59 Furthermore, the
Court looked at jury decisions and found that, in most cases, the
jury did not impose the death sentence for rape. 60 The Court
held that the rejection, by state legislatures, of capital
punishment for rape confirmed their finding that death is a
disproportionate penalty for the rape of an adult woman. 61
The Court's inquiry was not limited to public sentiment
because the Court concluded it must analyze for itself whether
the punishment fits the crime. 62 The Court did not deny that
rape was a serious and violent crime, acknowledging rape as
"'the ultimate violation of self.' "63 Even so, the Court found that
injury to the victim, and the public, from the crime of rape does
not compare to that of murder because "rape by definition does
58 Coker, 433 U.S. at 594. The Court stated that if "the 'most marked indication
of society's endorsement of the death penalty for murder is the legislative response
to Furman,' it should also be a telling datum that the public judgment with respect
to rape, as reflected in the statutes providing the punishment for that crime, has
been dramatically different." Id. (citation omitted). At the time of Coker, only three
states (Georgia, North Carolina, and Louisiana) that previously had the death
penalty for rape continued to do so in their revised death penalty statutes. See id.
The Court further stated that two of those three states, Louisiana and North
Carolina, had to revise their statutes because they called for mandatory death
sentences. Death penalties could not be mandatory. See id. When they revised their
statutes a second time, the legislatures authorized the death penalty for murder,
but not for rape. See id. Additionally, the Court noted that the other states which
had previously sanctioned the death penalty for rape, and needed to revise their
mandatory death penalty laws, did not enact new death penalty statutes for rape.
See id. The Court also noted that three other states (Florida, Mississippi, and
Tennessee) authorized the death penalty for rape, but only where the rapist was an
adult and the victim a child. See id. at 595.
59 Id. at 596 (footnote omitted).
60 See id. at 597. The Court noted that they could only look at jury decisions
where the death penalty for the rape of an adult woman was an option, which left
only Georgia jury statistics. See id. at 596. The state argued that juries only
reserved the death penalty for the most aggravated rapes. See id. at 597. Even so,
the Court stated that "[n]evertheless ... [in] 9 out of 10 [cases], juries ha[d] not
imposed the death sentence." Id.

61 See id.
62

See id.

63 Id. (footnote omitted).
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not include the death of or even the serious injury to another
person. The murderer kills; the rapist, if no more than that,
does not."64 Furthermore, although Coker was found to have
committed rape under two aggravating circumstances, 65 the
Court stated that this did not change its holding that capital
punishment is a disproportionate sentence for rape and,
66
therefore, a violation of the Eighth Amendment.
The Supreme Court has traditionally used precedent and
societal standards in its death penalty jurisprudence. 67 The
Supreme Court has indicated that when legislators, juries, and,
thereby, society as a whole, indicate that they do not feel that
the imposition of the death penalty for a particular crime is
warranted, the Court will find such a sentence unconstitutional.
The Coker case has shown that, historically, the death penalty
was not a popular punishment for the crime of rape. 68 Society's
stance on the death penalty for the crime of rape, as set forth in
Coker, has not changed since. Society has not shown a strong
standing behind the constitutionality of the death penalty for
any category of rape. 69 The death penalty, as the Coker Court
indicated, can only comport with contemporary standards of
decency when it is imposed for crimes involving the death of the
victim. Against this background, the Supreme Court should
follow and extend the Coker decision if called upon to review the
constitutionality of capital child rape statutes. In doing so, the
imposition of the death penalty for the rape of a child would be

64 Id. at 598 (footnote omitted).

65 See id. at 599 (noting that the jury had found that Coker had two
aggravating circumstances: (1) a prior record of conviction for a capital felony and
(2) that he had been engaged in the commission of another capital felony while
committing the rape). The Georgia law required that at least one of several
aggravating factors exist for the rapist to be sentenced to execution. See id. at 598-

99 (enumerating the aggravating circumstances).
66 See id. at 599.

67 See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330-31 (1989) (explaining that the
Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments deemed cruel and unusual at the time
the Bill of Rights was adopted and punishments that offend society's evolving
standards of decency).
68 See Coker, 433 U.S. at 593.
69 See Eric Pooley, Death or Life, TIME, June 16, 1997, at 31 (reporting that a
survey indicated that more than 75% of individuals polled favored the death penalty
for the murder of a President, a police officer, or an ordinary citizen, but only 47% of
the same group of respondents thought the crime of rape warranted execution). See
id. at 33.
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found unconstitutional and a violation of the Eighth Amendment
of the United States Constitution.
B. Applying Coker and the Eighth Amendment Proportionality
Test to Capital ChildRape Statutes
After Furman,70 the death penalty for the rape of a child was
authorized by only three states-Tennessee, Mississippi, and
Florida. Tennessee's statute was subsequently invalidated
because the death sentence was mandatory. 71 Mississippi's law
was rendered moot by other provisions in the state's statutory
scheme,7 2 which allowed for imposition of the death penalty only
upon a finding of an actual killing, an attempt to kill, an intent
to kill, or a crime committed with the contemplation that lethal
force would be used.7 3 Florida's capital child rape statute7 4
remained law until 1981, when Buford v. State invalidated it.75
The Florida Supreme Court, in the Buford decision, strongly
emphasized the Coker Court's statement that, regardless of the
circumstances of the rape, it did "not change the fact that the
instant crime being punished is a rape not involving the taking
of life." 76 The Florida Supreme Court held that the reasoning of
the Justices in Coker compelled them to hold that the sentence of
death for the crime of sexual assault, regardless of the victim's
age, is a "grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment"
and "forbidden by the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual
408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
See Collins v. State, 550 S.W.2d 643, 646 (Tenn. 1977).
See Leatherwood v. State, 548 So. 2d 389, 402 (Miss. 1989) (noting that it
was not necessary to examine the Coker decision or the constitutionality of the
70
71
72

death sentence in child rape cases because of Mississippi's statutory scheme).
73 Mississippi had a statute on the books, which authorized the imposition of
the death penalty for the rape of a female child under 12. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 973-65(1) (Supp. 1988). Another sentencing statute, however, precluded imposition of
the death penalty for the crime of rape. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101 (Supp.
1988). The legislature attempted to amend the statute so that the death penalty
could be imposed for the rape of a child under the age of 14, however, the bill died in
committee. See Miss. H.B. 558 (1997). In 1998, the entire section was rewritten as a
non-capital statutory rape law. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-65 (Supp. 1999).
74 See FLA. STAT. ch. 794.011(2) (1999) (making "sexual battery upon, or injury
to] ... the sexual organs of, a person less than 12 years of age.., a capital felony").
75 403 So. 2d 943, 951-54 (Fla. 1981) (repealing a statute that allowed -for the
death penalty for sexual battery (rape) upon a child under 11 years old); see also
Batie v. State, 534 So. 2d 694, 695 (Fla. 1988) (reaffirming the Buford holding).
76 Buford, 403 So. 2d at 951 (discussing at length the Coker decision and
comparing the Georgia statute to the Florida statute).
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punishment."77 The Florida court found that the Court, in Coker,
limited the constitutionality of the death penalty to crimes where
78
the victim has died.
Many agree with the Florida Supreme Court, yet two death
penalty statutes for the rape of a child were still introduced into
legislation, and both passed. 79 The Louisiana Supreme Court
was the first court to pass upon the constitutionality of capital
child rape statutes since Buford. In State v. Wilson,80 the court
found that Coker did not foreclose the issue of the
constitutionality of the death penalty for the rape of a child.81
The Wilson court differentiated the Coker decision by limiting it
to its facts-specifically that the rape in Coker was of an adult
woman, not a child.82 Additionally, the Wilson court sidestepped the Court's test of proportionality and disregarded its
statement that regardless of the circumstances of the rape, it did
"not change the fact that the instant crime being punished [was]
a rape not involving the taking of life."88 The Wilson court, as set

forth below, ignored the Supreme Court's apparent bright-line
prerequisite of death for the constitutional imposition of the
84
death penalty.
1. Legislative Enactments
In following Coker's proportionality test, the Wilson court
looked at legislative enactments, which had hardly changed
since Coker.85 In fact, any state that had a capital child rape
77
78
79
80
81

Id.

See id.
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
685 So. 2d 1063 (La. 1996).
See id. at 1073 (reasoning that "[iun reaching [our holding] we give great

deference to our legislature's determination ofthe appropriateness of the penalty").
82 See id. at 1066 (stating that "the plurality took great pains in referring only
to the rape of adult women throughout their opinion, leaving open the question of
the rape of a child") (footnote omitted). The Wilson court looked at the language of
Coker and stated that the plurality decision only applied to the rape of an adult
woman because the Court had referred specifically to that classification of rape
fourteen times. See id. at 1066 n.2. If one is looking at semantics, this argument
fails because the Louisiana court neglected to count the times the Coker Court
referred to rape generally, not just to the rape of an adult woman. See generally
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 586-600 (1977) (plurality) (using the term "rape,"
without the words "of an adult woman," over 20 times).
83 Coker, 433 U.S. at 599.
84

85

See infra Part H.B.3.
See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
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statute at the time of Coker had since repudiated their statute in
one manner or another. 86 By the time Wilson was decided,
Louisiana was the only state with any sort of capital rape statute
on the books.87 The Louisiana court, rather than following
Coker's proportionality requirements, created its own reasoning
as to what legislative action, or inaction, indicated. The court
referred to the small number of capital rape statutes that were
passed prior to Coker as "hasty legislative compromise[s]'" in
response to the Furman decision. 88 The Wilson court reasoned
that, unlike the Coker Court, they should not only look to the
recent past to consider the constitutionality of a death penalty
statute because the "[statutes applied in one state can be
carefully watched by other states so that the experience of the
first state becomes available to all other states."8 9 The court
went on to state that, although it had been over a year since the
passage of the Louisiana statute, other states may be watching
to follow suit.90 Therefore, the fact that Louisiana was the only
state with such a statute could not "be deemed determinative." 91
The Wilson court was neglectful in its assessments. The
Louisiana court purported to follow the Coker test, which held
that "legislative rejection of capital punishment for rape strongly
confirms [its] own judgment, which is that death is indeed a
disproportionate penalty for the crime of raping an adult
woman."92 Only Louisiana had a statute of this kind on its
books, and today, only two other states have considered passing
the same.93 Furthermore, in the twenty-seven years since
Furman, no state has enacted or reenacted any capital rape
statutes aside from Louisiana. By indicating that legislative
determinations were, in fact, not determinative, the Louisiana
court overstepped years of national death penalty jurisprudence
that held otherwise. 94 Additionally, in the past, the Supreme
86 See supra notes 67-75 and accompanying text.
87 See Wilson, 685 So. 2d at 1068 (noting that Louisiana was, at that time, "the
only state that... ha[d] a law in effect that provide[d] for the death penalty for the

rape of a child less than twelve").
88 Id. at 1068 (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 614 (Powell, J., dissenting)).
89 Id. at 1069 (citation omitted).
00 See id.
01 Id. at 1068.
92 Coker, 433 U.S. at 597.
93
94

See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 792-93 (1982).
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Court has addressed international law in its death penalty
jurisprudence. 95 Had the Wilson court done so it would have
seen that, " '[elvery Western industrial nation has stopped
executing criminals [for any crime] except the United States.' 96
Society, as indicated by legislatures and the rest of the
world, has not been calling for capital punishment for any form
of rape.9 7 The Wilson court's argument that other states are
"waiting around to see what happens" lacks strength and
controverts the test of looking at legislation as one of the
strongest objective indicators of society's evolving standards of
decency. 98 Although the people of Louisiana may have called for
their legislature to pass a capital child rape statute, the
Supreme Court cannot constitutionally disregard the fact that
the people of at least forty-seven other states have not. 99
2. Jury Decisions and Public Sentiment
Since no one has yet been convicted under Louisiana's
capital child rape statute, and it is the only state that has such a
statute, it would be difficult to analyze jury behavior regarding
capital punishment for the rape of a child. Nevertheless, the
history of capital punishment and rape, as set forth in Coker,

[The current legislative judgment with respect to imposition of the death
penalty where a defendant did not take life, attempt to take it, or intend to
take life is neither 'wholly unanimous among state legislatures,' nor as
compelling as the legislative judgments considered in Coker, it
nevertheless weighs on the side of rejecting capital punishment for the
crime at issue.
Id. (citation omitted); Coker, 433 U.S. at 597 ("[Ihe legislative rejection of capital
punishment for rape strongly confirms our own judgment, which is that death is
indeed a disproportionate penalty for the crime of rap[e] ... ."); Gregg v. Georgia,

428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976) (holding that legislative judgment is given heavy weight in
determining whether society's standards of decency would allow capital punishment
for a particular crime).
95 See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 796-97 n.22 (noting the international trend against
expanding the death penalty to crimes other than murder). See generally Kristi
Tumminello Prinzo, The United States-Capital"of the World: An Analysis of Why
the United States Practices Capital Punishment While the International Trend is
Toward Its Abolition, 24 BROOK J. INTL L. 855 (1999).
96 Rudolph J. Gerber, Death Is Not Worth It, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 335, 353 (1996)
(quoting VICTOR E. KAPPELER ET AL., THE MYTHOLOGY OF CRIME AND CRIMINAL

JUSTICE 196-97 (1993)).
97 See id.; see also supranote 69 and accompanying text.
98 See supra notes 38, 46-49, 58, 61, 67-69, 95 and accompanying text.
99 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. Louisiana and Mississippi currently
have capital rape statutes, while Georgia's statute has passed the legislature.
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indicates that public sentiment does not often call for such a
Moreover, although there are nonsevere punishment. 10 0
homicidal capital statutes on the books,' 0 ' "no defendant has
been executed for a nonhomicid[al] crime in the United States
since 1975, and since 1977 no judge or jury in the United States
has imposed the death penalty on a defendant in a
nonhomicid[all case."10 2 Furthermore, the public has shown
that, when given alternative punishments, people are not in
favor of imposing the death penalty. 0 3 The Louisiana court in
Wilson, however, does not address these facts. Should the
Supreme Court be called upon to review the constitutionality of
capital child rape statutes, this indicia supports finding capital
child rape statutes unconstitutional. It appears that society is
not ready to impose such a severe and final punishment as death
for crimes not involving the taking of a human life.
3. Crime Without Death
The Coker Court was emphatic in its proclamation that it
was unconstitutional to take a human life where one was not
taken. 10 4 The Wilson court disregarded this reasoning and
stated that "[w]hile the rape of an adult female is in itself
reprehensible, the legislature has concluded that rape becomes
much more detestable when the victim is a child."10 5 The Wilson
court discussed the need to protect children as a special class of
people because of their particular vulnerabilities. 10 6 The court
IO1 See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text. The Court, in Coker,
examined jury decisions regarding capital punishment for rape as another indicator
of society's standards of decency, finding that, in nine out often cases, juries did not
impose the death sentence. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
101 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
102 State v. Gardner, 947 P.2d 630, 650 (Utah 1997) (finding the death penalty
for aggravated assault by a prisoner unconstitutionally cruel and unusual).
103 See DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH

PENALTY 4 (1997) ("Public support for the death penalty drops below 50% when
voters are offered alternative sentences. More people would support life without
parole plus restitution to the victim's family than would choose the death penalty.").
It is important to note that public support for the death penalty drops when
restitution is awarded to the victim's family.
104 See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 594, 598 (1977) (plurality opinion) (stating
that rape "does not compare with murder" and that the Court has "the abiding
conviction" that capital punishment for rape is excessive).
105 685 So. 2d 1063, 1066 (La. 1996).
106 See id. at 1067. But see infra Part IV (discussing the effect of a capital child
rape statute on the child victims).
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ultimately found that "given the appalling nature of the crime,
the severity of the harm inflicted upon the victim, and the harm
imposed on society, the death penalty is not an excessive penalty
for the crime of rape when the victim is a child under the age of
twelve years old." 107 Despite the Louisiana court's positing of the
importance of protecting the children, this is not enough to
disregard the Supreme Court's prior interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment-that death cannot be imposed where a life has not
been taken.
The Coker Court found that as reprehensible as the crime of
rape is, "it does not compare with murder, which does involve the
unjustified taking of human life ....
We have the abiding
conviction that the death penalty, which 'is unique in its severity
and irrevocability,' is an excessive penalty for the rapist who, as
such, does not take human life." 08 Furthermore, the Court
stated that "i]t is difficult to accept the notion, and we do not,
that the rapist... should be punished more heavily than the
deliberate killer as long as the rapist does not himself take the
life of his victim."10 9 It is apparent from the language in Coker
that the Court was not simply barring the imposition of the
death penalty for the crime of rape of an adult woman, but
rather barring the death penalty for any form of rape so long as
no death had occurred. Although, in Wilson, the Louisiana court
looked to the language of Coker for its rationale, it mistakenly
disregarded the language requiring a prerequisite of death for
the imposition of the death penalty.
Furthermore, the dissenting Justices in Coker came to their
own conclusions with respect to the meaning of the plurality
opinion. Justice Powell asserted that the plurality's opinion was
not limited to the case before the Court. He wrote that the
"opinion... ranges well beyond what is necessary, it holds that
capital punishment always-regardlessof the circumstances-is
a disproportionate penalty for the crime of rape." 110 He believed
that the plurality opinion prevented state legislatures from
creating capital rape statutes for a narrowly defined crime of
aggravated rape, thus foreclosing the issue of the

107 Id. at 1070.
108 433 U.S. at 598

(quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976)).
109Id. at 600.
110 Id. at 601 (PoweU, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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constitutionality of capital punishment for any form of rape. 1 '
He averred that the plurality's "expansive pronouncement...
draws a bright line between murder and all rapes-regardless of
the degree of brutality of the rape or the effect upon the
victim."1 2
Justice Burger ventured further in his dissent,
stating that "[t]he clear implication of today's holding appears to
be that the death penalty may be properly imposed only as to
crimes resulting in death of the victim.""13
The Louisiana court used the language of the Coker Court
and the reasoning in Coker's dissent to support its findings that
a capital child rape statute is constitutional." 4 It is submitted
that the Louisiana court should have also viewed the dissent as
an indicator of the true meaning of Coker. This Note, and many
others, contend that the "bright-line" between murder and rape,
spoken of by Justice Powell, is not limited to rape cases-but,
rather, that the "bright-line" extends to any crime where a death
has not occurred." 5
Aside from disregarding the Coker
proportionality test and creating its own line of reasoning, the
Louisiana court in Wilson stepped over this bright-line
prerequisite of death. Although the dissent in Coker is not
binding on any court, it is a strong indicator that the Court's
plurality opinion was limiting the constitutional imposition of
the death penalty to crimes involving the death of the victim.
It is also important to note the fear that constitutionally
sanctioning the death penalty for the rape of a child may result
in a "slippery slope" problem. 1 6 Once there is a departure from
11 See id. at 602.
112
113
114

Id. at 603.

Id. at 621 (Burger, J., dissenting).
See State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1069 (La. 1996).
11 See generally Sandra R. Acosta, Imposing the Death Penalty Upon Drug
Kingpins, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 596 (1990) (exploring the death penalty for some
drug crimes not involving a death); Andrew H. Friedman, Tison v. Arizona: The
Death Penalty and the Non-Triggerman: The Scales of Justice Are Broken, 75
CORNELL L. REV. 123 (1989) (discussing the idea that the execution of a nontriggerman accomplice is cruel and unusual punishment); Neil C. Schur, Assessing
the Constitutionality and Policy Implications of the 1994 Drug Kingpin Death
Penalty, 2 TEY. F. ON CIV. L. & CIV. RTS. 141 (1996) (opining that imposing the
death penalty is bad policy where there is no unjustified taking of a life).
116 See Acosta, supra note 115, at 611 (discussing the dangers of allowing the
death penalty for less serious crimes); Joe Gyan, Jr., Justices Won't Review Child
Rape Law Again, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., Jan. 8, 1997, at 14 ("'[Djeath penalty for
attempted murders and for child abuse cannot be far behind' "); Michael Higgins, Is
CapitalPunishmentfor Killers Only? A.B.A. J., Aug. 1997, at 30, 30-31 (discussing a
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the "bright-line prerequisite of a victim's death in imposing
capital punishment" the death sentence may begin to be
authorized for even less severe crimes." 7
Consequently,
constitutionally sanctioning capital child rape statutes defies
Supreme Court precedent and may alter our high standards of
justice in capital punishment jurisprudence.
The Supreme Court, in its own assessment of the
constitutionality of capital rape statutes, will not allow the
imposition of the death penalty where no life has been taken.
Thus, allowing the death penalty for the rape of a child would be
a disproportionate punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Court has
created a bright-line prerequisite, and if the Court allows the
imposition of the death penalty for the rape of a child, as the
Louisiana court did, the Court would cross its own constitutional
boundaries.
III. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT REQUIREMENTS OF MENTAL
CULPABILITY AND AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN DEATH
PENALTY JURISPRUDENCE

Part of the premise of the Court's death penalty
jurisprudence is that capital punishment is "cruel and unusual
punishment" where the defendant has not taken the life of the
victim. Even when a case involves a murder, a degree of
participation and culpability is required for a capital sentence to
be upheld. Furthermore, where a defendant is convicted of
murder, the jury must then find at least one aggravating
circumstance to constitutionally impose the death penalty.
Therefore, the murderer must do more than intentionally
murder," 8 and an accomplice to felony-murder must carry some
requisite mental state and degree of participation before the
death penalty can be imposed." 9

law professor's opinion, the article states "[hie fears a slippery slope leading to the
death penalty for less serious crimes").
117 Acosta, supranote 115, at 611.
's

See discussion infra Part III.B (discussing the requirement of aggravating

circumstances).
"9 See discussion infra Part III.A (exploring the requisite mental state for
imposition of the death penalty).
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A. The EighthAmendment's Mental Culpability Requirement
In 1978, the Supreme Court, in Lockett v. Ohio,120 reversed
the death sentence of a non-triggerman involved in a felonymurder. The Court found the sentence unconstitutional because
the statute did not permit the individualized consideration of
mitigating factors necessary to treat the defendant "with [the]
121
degree of respect due the uniqueness of the individual."
Lockett challenged the ruling that the jury could not consider
her lack of specific intent
to cause death, and her relatively
minor part in the crime. 122 In its decision, the Court implied
that it was necessary, in capital non-triggerman cases, to
consider this lack of intent to kill as a mitigating circumstance in
order for the death penalty to be constitutionally imposed. 12
Expanding upon this premise in Enmund v. Florida,124 the
Court directly addressed the question of whether the Eighth
Amendment allows the imposition of the death penalty in a case
where the defendant did not himself kill, attempt to kill, nor
intend to kill. The Court explained that imposition of the death
penalty must serve retributive or deterrent goals. 12
Not
convinced that the death penalty would deter, the Court stated
that "the threat that the death penalty will be imposed for
murder will [not] measurably deter one who does not kill and
has no intention or purpose that life will be taken."126
Furthermore, retributive goals would not be met because
"[p]utting Enmund to death to avenge two killings that he did
not commit and had no intention of committing... does not
120 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978).
121 Id. at 605.
122 See id. at 597. Lockett was with a group of people who needed some money
and formed a plan to rob a pawnshop. There was no plan to kill the owner of the
shop in the process, but they did plan to use a gun. She knew the owner of the shop,
so she would not enter the store. Even so, she brought the others to the store to
commit the robbery, while she waited in the getaway car. During the robbery, the
pawnbroker grabbed the gun, it went off, and he was killed. See id. at 590.
123 See id. at 605 (discussing the need to consider mitigating factors in capital
cases). The Court found that the sentencer must give individualized consideration to
mitigating factors, including looking at the circumstances of the offense. See id.
m 458 U.S. 782 (1982). Enmund involved the robbery and fatal shooting of an
elderly couple in their Florida farmhouse. One witness saw the defendant, Enmund,
as a passenger in the get-away car prior to the shooting. After the shooting, the
witness saw Enmund driving the same car at a high-rate of speed with two people
lying down in the backseat. See id. at 784.
'm See id. at 798 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)).
1w Id. at 798-99.
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measurably contribute to the retributive end of ensuring that the
criminal gets his just deserts." 127 The Court also reviewed
legislation 23 and jury decisions rejecting the death penalty for
accomplice liability in felony-murder cases. Ultimately, the
Court held that "absence of proof that Enmund killed or
attempted to kill, and regardless of whether Enmund intended
or contemplated that life would be taken," the imposition of the
death penalty was unconstitutional for a felony-murder
accomplice. 1'
Five years later, in Tison v. Arizona,130 the Court qualified
its decision in Enmund and added another degree of mental
culpability to the category of accomplice felony-murder offenders
who could qualify for the death sentence. While Enmund only
had minor participation in the felony, the Tison brothers
significantly participated in the underlying felony. 31 ' The
brothers showed a "reckless disregard for human life implicit in
knowingly engaging in criminal activities known to carry a grave
risk of death."13 2 The Court held, therefore, that the Tisons'
highly culpable mental state, in combination with their major
participation in the felony committed, made the imposition of the

127

Id. at 801.

128 Eight states allowed for the imposition of the death penalty solely for
participating in a robbery where another robber killed. Eleven more states allowed
for the death penalty for an accomplice felony-murderer only if there is proof of the
defendant's culpability. See id. at 789. The Court went on to evaluate other state
capital statutes and concluded that the legislative judgments "weigh[ed] on the side
of rejecting capital punishment for the crime at issue [accomplice felony murder]."
Id. at 793.
12 Id. at 801; see also Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376 (1986). Cabanainvolved
a defendant who was sentenced to death for felony-murder. He challenged the
conviction, claiming that the jury's verdict did not reflect a finding that he himself
killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill, as required by Enmrund. See id. at 383.
The Court stated that Enmund "imposes a categorical rule: a person who has not in
fact killed, attempted to kill, or intended that a killing take place or that lethal force
be used may not be sentenced to death." Id. at 386.
130 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
131See id. The defendant brothers, along with other family members, helped
their father escape from prison. He was serving a life sentence for killing a guard
during a previous escape. They were fully armed, assisted in kidnapping and
robbing a family, and watched as their father killed that family. Although the
defendants claim they did not expect the shootings, they made no attempt to help
the family escape. See id. at 137. The Court used the brothers "substantial"
participation in the crime as one of the major factors in justifying the imposition of
the death penalty for their crime. Id. at 158.
132

Id. at 157.

CAPITAL CHILD RAPE STATUTES

1999]

1183

death penalty constitutional 33
Consequently, the Court
expanded the culpability requirement-even in the absence of an
intent to kill, a showing of reckless disregard for human life
134
where a death had occurred justified the death penalty.
Even when a death occurs, the Supreme Court requires a
degree of participation and culpability in order to uphold a
capital sentence. In fact, in the Enmund case, the Court echoed
Coker:
"[Robbery] does not compare with murder, which does involve
the unjustified taking of human life. Although it may be
accompanied by another crime, [robbery] by definition does not
include the death of or even the serious injury to another
person. The murderer kills; the [robber], if no more than that,
does not. Life is over for the victim of the murderer; for the
[robbery] victim, life... is not over and normally is not beyond
repair".... As was said of the crime of rape in Coker, we have
the abiding conviction that the death penalty.., is an excessive
penalty for the robber who, as such, does not take human
35
life.1
In Enmund, the Court required criminal culpability to be
limited to the crime committed, "and his punishment must be
tailored to his personal responsibility and moral guilt."136 In
Tison,137 the Court narrowed the culpability requirement,
concluding that there was an "apparent consensus that
substantial participation in a violent felony under circumstances
likely to result in the loss of innocent human life may justify the
death penalty even absent an 'intent to kill.' "18 An individual's
culpability is given particularly close attention in capital

See id. at 158.
See id. (holding that "major participation in the felony committed, combined
with reckless indifference to human life, is sufficient to satisfy the Enmund
culpability requirement"). In fact, on remand, the prosecution was unable to prove
the Tison brothers had the necessary mental culpability and both of their death
sentences were reduced to life imprisonment. See J.W. Brown, Second Tison
Resentenced to Life Terms, PHOENIX GAZETTE, July 20, 1992, at B2; Pamela
Manson, Ricky Tison Taken Off Death Row, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, July 11, 1992, at
B2.
= Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (citations omitted).
136Id. at 801. The Court held that the fact that Enmund did not kill nor
attempt to kill requires it to find the punishment of death unconstitutionally
excessive. See id. at 798.
13

134

137

481 U.S. 137.

=s Id. at 154.
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cases. 139 Thus, the Tison and Enmund cases established a
culpability requirement in sentencing a felony murderer to death
when the defendant himself had not killed the victim. The Court
made it clear that in the absence of the defendant's requisite
mental culpability, and proof of the defendant's substantial
participation in the victim's death, a capital sentence cannot be
constitutionally imposed. Since the rape of a child does not
involve a victim's death, imposing capital punishment for the
crime does not meet these requirements.
B. The Requirement ofAggravating Circumstancesin Capital
Cases
Another consideration in determining the constitutionality
of statutes calling for capital punishment for the rape of a child
is whether there are sufficient aggravating circumstances for the
jury to consider. Even when murder is involved, aggravating
circumstances must be found. 140 The trier of fact must find
beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one statutory
aggravating factor exists before death can constitutionally be
imposed.' 4 ' Capital child rape statutes conflict with this
requirement because the only aggravating circumstance is the
strict liability element of the victim's age. 142 The Supreme Court
has held that a death sentence is not invalid, even where the
only aggravating circumstance found by the jury is an element of
the crime. 143 The jury, however, must find that this aggravating
139 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) ("When a defendant's life is
at stake, the Court has been particularly sensitive to insure that every safeguard is

observed.").

140 See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980) (holding that proof of two
murders without grisly facts did not qualify as the aggravating circumstances need
to justify execution).
141 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 193-95. Examples of statutory aggravating

circumstances include: murder committed by a convict in prison; the defendant
created a great risk of death to many persons; the murder was especially heinous,
atrocious or cruel. See id. at 193 n.44 (detailing the aggravating circumstances cited
in the Model Penal Code).
142 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42(A)(4) (West Supp. 1997).
143 See Lowenfeld v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 241 (1988) (holding

that the jury's
task is two-fold: to find that the defendant, beyond a reasonable doubt, is both guilty
of the crime itself and that the aggravating circumstance has been proven to the
same degree of proof); see also Sandra D. Jordan, Death ForDrug Related Killings:
Revival of the Federal Death Penalty, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 79, 104 (1991)

(referencing Lowenfeld, and noting that when the aggravating factors in a statute
include the mens rea necessary for conviction of the underlying offense, once the
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factor exists beyond a reasonable doubt. 14 In a capital rape
statute, the child's age is a strict liability aggravating
circumstance, 145 and as such, would not conform to the
requirement of sentences being imposed in a non-arbitrary and
non-capricious manner because the existing aggravating
circumstance, the defendant's knowledge of the child's age,
would not have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 14 This
does not follow the Court's requirements regarding aggravating
circumstances, and, therefore, would not pass constitutional
review. Furthermore, society's standards of decency would not
allow someone to be executed where a strict liability element is
the factor that calls for the punishment of death. 147
Additionally, the Court, in Coker, makes a strong argument
in stating that:
[E]ven where the killing is deliberate, it is not punishable by
death absent proof of aggravating circumstances. It is difficult
to accept the notion, and we do not, that the rapist, with or
without aggravating circumstances, should be punished more
heavily than the deliberate killer as long as the rapist does not
himself take the life of his victim. 148

prosecutor has proven a defendant guilty, "the prosecutor has already proven a
substantial case for death").
14 See Lowenfeld, 484 U.S. at 242.
145 See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 130 (1995).
Statutory rape is ordinarily considered to be a strict liability crime in regard to the

age of the victim. "Thus, [the defendant's] erroneous belief, no matter how
reasonable, that the female was above the statutory age of consent, does not
exculpate him." Id.; see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN § 14:42(A)(4) ("Lack of knowledge
of the victim's age shall not be a defense.").
146 See DRESSLER, supra note 145, at 136.
147 See Higgins, supra note 116, at 31 (" 'You could have the death penalty
[based on] strict liability... [and tihat would be pretty amazing.' "). Additionally,
consider "a 16-year-old boy [who has] consensual intercourse with a girl one day shy
of her 12th birthday and physically developed beyond her years." Gyan, supra note
116, at 14. Are we going to put him to death? And, consider this fact: "It is estimated
that there are over 600 thousand juvenile prostitutes ranging in age from 6 to 16
years." PAULA ALLEN-MEARS, SocIAL WORK WITH CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS

196 (1995). If a man is found with a prostitute under the age of 12 who sells sex for
a living, are we going to put him to death too? But see State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d
1063, 1072 (La. 1996) (arguing that a defendant may be permitted to introduce
mitigating evidence regarding his belief about the girl's age).
148 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977). Even though the Coker jury
found two of the aggravating circumstances set forth in the Georgia statute, the
court did not change its conclusion that death is a disproportionate punishment for
rape. See id. at 599.
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Therefore, regardless of whether aggravating circumstances
are found under a particular statute, the Court has indicated
that death is a prerequisite to capital punishment.
IV. THE STATE'S DUTY TO PROTECT ITS CHILDREN: CONSIDERING
THE CHILD VICTIMS

The sexual abuse of children is at the forefront of our
country's attention, and capital child rape statutes are being
enacted to protect children from sexual predators. 49 In Wilson,
the Louisiana court distinguished capital punishment for the
rape of a child from the rape of an adult woman by finding that
the legislature passed the statute under the notion that "rape
becomes much more detestable when the victim is a child ....
Since children cannot protect themselves, the State is given the
responsibility to protect them." 50
While the Wilson court's reasoning seeks to protect children,
the decision may have the unfortunate consequence of subjecting
child rape victims to greater harm. The rape of a child is one of
the most reprehensible and heinous crimes, thereby deserving a
severe punishment. The Court, however, in reviewing capital
child rape statues, need not only consider the injuries the crime
inflicts on the victim and society, 1 1 but must also consider the
duty the state has to protect children from greater harm.
First, a child rapist may kill the victim knowing that once
152
he rapes a child the penalty is just as severe as if he had
murdered the child. The rapist may feel he is better off killing
the child, therefore ridding himself of the prime witness against
him and perhaps escaping detection as the perpetrator of the
crime. 1 3 This argument has been made in other areas where the
149

See supra note 7 and accompanying text.

150 Wilson, 685 So. 2d at 1066-67.

151 The Coker Court stated that "[rape] is the 'ultimate violation of self...
[and] [blecause it undermines the community's sense of security, there is public
injury as well." Coker, 433 U.S. at 597-98.
152 I use "he" here because it has been shown that most sexual offenses against
children are committed by males. See LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE

STATISTICS

EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY,

CHILD

VICTIMIZERS:

VIOLENT

OFFENDERS AND THEIR VICTIMS 2 (1996) (stating that "[a]ll but 3% of offenders who
commito violent crimes against children [are] male").
163 See Margery B. Koosed, Letters, Deathfor Rapists EndangersPublic Safety,
NAT'L L.J., Aug. 25, 1997, at A18 ("Fear of the death penalty could lead some
offenders to kill their victims to escape detection or punishment."); Joe Gyan, Jr.,
Justices HearArguments On New Death Penalty Law, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., Oct.
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death penalty is inflicted for a crime where no death has
occurred, particularly the crime of kidnapping. 154
This
contention strongly suggests that a capital child rape statute
would not be an effective deterrent against a child rapist, but
rather an incentive for the rapist to become a killer.
The second consideration is that not only has the child
suffered psychological traumatization from the rape itself, but
then must suffer through the subsequent trial. 15 Sexual abuse
cases are some of the most difficult cases to try. 56 The child who
has been raped is the prosecution's key witness. 5 7 Children who
testify at sexual abuse trials are often attacked by defense
attorneys under the premise that they are fabricating their story
of sexual abuse. 58 A study examined the emotional effects upon
a child who testifies in a courtroom.159 It compared children who
had testified in sexual assault cases to those who had not, and
16, 1996, at 18 (noting that opponents of Louisiana's capital child rape statute fear
that it will "give rapists incentives to murder their victims if the penalty for murder
and child rape were the same"); Dan M. Kahan, Between Economics and Sociology:
The New Path of Deterrence,95 MICH. L. REV. 2477, 2490 (1997) (propounding that
increasing the severity of sentence for rape to life imprisonment, let alone the death
penalty, would more likely cause the rapist to kill his victim).
l4 See ALA. CODE § 13-A-6-44 (Michie 1994) (cmt). In discussing the
implications of a capital kidnapping statute it was said.
"What was originally intended as a protection to the victim, through
deterring infliction of serious harm to the ransom kidnap victim, was
converted into an invitation to the criminal to kill the victim.., since the
defendant thereby became eligible for the death penalty he was in no
worse case legally if he killed the victim and thus removed the best
prosecution witness against him."
Id. (quoting Michigan Revised Criminal Code, Committee Commentary to sections
2210 and 2211).
M

See JOHN E. B. MYERS, LEGAL ISSUES IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 171-75

(2d ed., 1992) (observing that "[flor many children the most traumatic aspect of
testifying is facing the adult accused of abusing them").
156 See generally NANCY WALKER PERRY & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE
CHILD WITNESS: LEGAL ISSUES AND DILEMMAS (1991); Robert T. Mertens, Child

Sexual Abuse in California:Legislative and JudicialResponses, 15 GOLDEN GATE U.
L. REV. 437 (1985); Charles R. Petrof, Protecting the Anonymity of Child Sexual
Assault Victims, 40 WAYNE L. REV. 1677 (1994).
157 See Comment, Child Sexual Abuse: A New Decade for Protection of Our
Children?, 39 EMORY L.J. 581, 607 (1990) (" 'Child victims are usually the key
witnesses in child abuse prosecutions;' their testimony is likely to be indispensable
to the conviction of the person who committed the crime."); see also MYERS, supra
note 155, at 31.
168 See MYERS, supra note 155, at 31 (contending that a child's memories and
sense of imagination are fertile grounds for a defense attorney to plant seeds of
doubt in the jurors' minds as to what actually happened). See generally id. at 30-83.

159 See Petrof supra note 156, at 1687.
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found that for those who did testify "the healing process [from
the rape] is delayed during court proceedings." 160 The fact that
these rape statutes involve the death penalty further extends the
child's trauma from the assault. Death penalty trials are often
long and arduous 161 and, consequently, if children become
involved in the judicial process, the horrible experience they
have gone through will become even more psychologically
traumatizing. Subjecting a child to a capital trial seemingly
precludes an easy healing process for the child and would subject
the child to more pain. As important as it is to protect children
from child rapists, it is equally important to protect them from
any further emotional trauma.
Alternative sources of injury to children must also be
considered. One of the major problems with child sexual abuse
is that it often goes unreported. 162 The main reason stems from
the fact that most sexual offenses against children are
committed by a father, stepfather, or someone the child knows.'63
A study of incarcerated child victimizers found that in the
majority of cases the victim was someone the offender knew
before the crime was committed. 1 4 Approximately one in seven
child victimizers reported that the victim was a stranger to
them. One-third of the prisoners had committed offenses against
their own child, and almost half had some sort of relationship
with the victim as a friend, acquaintance, or relative prior to the
crime. 165 Furthermore, in a National Incidence Study of Child
Abuse and Neglect it was found that over fifty percent of
160 Id. at 1688.
161 See PATERNOSTER, supra note 3, at 191-213 (discussing the cost of a capital
trial because of the requirement of a guilt and penalty phase, as well as a long and
costly appeals process). As the mother of a seven-year-old child who was kidnapped
and murdered said, " '[t]he death penalty causes family members more pain than
other sentences. The continuous sequence of courtroom scenes inherent in death
penalty cases only serve to keep emotional wounds raw and in pain for years.'" REV.

JESSE JACKSON, LEGAL LYNCHING: RACE, INJUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 57
(1996).
162 The actual number of abused children is unknown because countless cases of
child abuse go unreported. See BARBARA TATEM KELLEY ET AL., U.S. DEPIT OF
JUSTICE, JUVENILE JUSTICE BULL., IN THE WAKE OF CHILDHOOD MALTREATMENT 1

(1997).
163 See DEBRA WHITCOMB, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE: ISSUES AND
PRACTICES, WHEN THE VICTIM IS A CHILD 2 (2d ed. 1992); see also Mertens, supra
note 156, at 441-42 (1985).
164 See GREENFELD, supra note 152, at 2.
165 See id.
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sexually abused children were the victims of a parent, or a nonparent acquaintance or parent-substitute. 166 When the sexual
offender is a member or acquaintance of the family, the family is
less willing to report the crime. 167 For instance, in incest cases
mothers often do not stop the abuse because they either refuse to
believe the child or they feel too frightened or dependent on their
husbands to take action.16 Furthermore, the rapist can use his
potential death sentence to deter the child from reporting the
rape to another adult. All of this leads to the conclusion that
authorizing death for the rape of a child will diminish the
willingness to report the rape and, therefore, allow the child
rapist to walk free and rape again.169
Capital child rape statutes may incapacitate a child rapist
by putting him to death for his crime, but these statutes will not
meet the State's duty to protect our children. These statutes do
more harm than good. In effectuating the death sentence for
child rapists, legislatures are: (1) increasing the likelihood that
the child being raped will also be killed; (2) drawing out the
psychological effects of rape by extending the child's traumatic
experience to a long capital sentencing process; and (3)
diminishing the likelihood that these rapes will be reported.
Capital child rape statutes are not the most effective way to
afford children special protection from harm.
CONCLUSION
Capital punishment has been an acceptable criminal penalty
since the time of the American colonies. Although the Supreme
Court first evaluated the disposition of capital punishment in
relation to the way a criminal was executed, the Court's, and
166 See ANDREA J. SEDLAK & DIANE D. BROADHURST, U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVIcEs, THIRD NATIONAL INCIDENCE STUDY OF CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT: FINAL REPORT 12-13 (1996).

167 See Phyllis Coleman, Creating Therapist-Incest Offender Exception to
Mandatory Child Abuse Reporting Statutes-When PsychiatristKnows Best, 54 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1113, 1116 (1986) (stating when there are no witnesses or the
witnesses are family members, there is a reluctance for the victim to testify).
16s See ELAINE LANDAU, CHILD ABUSE: AN AMERICAN EPIDEMIC 72 (1984)
(noting that nonaction leads to the sacrificing of their daughters to their husband's
desire and whim).
169 See John Holdridge, Letters: Capital Rape, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1997, at 106
(noting that in the Bethley amici brief it was argued that" '[a]uthorizing the death
penalty for this crime will only make the victims and their mothers even less willing
to come forward' ").
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society's, standards have evolved to require proportionality in
imposing death.
Furthermore, our "evolving standards of
decency" have led the Court to conclude that the punishment of
death is only deserved where a life has been taken. The brightline prerequisite for the death penalty to be constitutionally
imposed-the victim's death-has been etched into death
penalty jurisprudence. Ultimately, the Court has expounded on
its resounding pronunciations that death is different. Death is
different; it is so severe and final, that it is reserved as a
punishment only for instances where a life has been taken; only
death can bring forth the punishment of death. Consequently,
statutes that call for the death penalty for the rape of a child do
not stand up to constitutional scrutiny. Although noble in their
efforts, legislatures must find other constitutionally effective
ways to protect children from their most dangerous enemieschild rapists.
Meryl P. Diamond

